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I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks are constantly bombarded by malicious
attacks. In 2014, Symantec, a premier cybersecurity service,
reportedly blocked 496,657 web attackers per day and encountered
over 317 million new variants of malware that infect computers.' In
2015, McAfee, another cybersecurity service, encountered over 1.2
million new variants of malware that infect mobile devices, raising the
grand total of malware variants our devices are susceptible to to 8.5
million variants.2 These numbers, reported by only two services,
reflect an infinitesimally small portion of malicious activities.
Without question, the number of web attacks, mobile attacks, and
variants of malware worldwide is incalculable, largely for two
reasons. First, investigating attacks in cyberspace is not like
investigating an attack in the physical world, and while industry
experts work furiously to develop better forensic tools, the fact of the
matter remains that most malicious cyber activities go unnoticed.
Second, if or when the activity is detected, there remains the costly
and time-consuming problem of figuring out who did it and how to
prevent that activity in the future.
Cyber-based threats are as varied in nature, scale, and scope as the
actors that perpetrate them.3 To name a few, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) has been the victim of an ongoing cyber espionage
campaign directed by the People's Republic of China since 2002. In
2007, Russian operatives launched a series of distributed denial-of-
1. "Malicious software," often referred to as "malware," refers to information
designed to cause damage or disruption to a computer or computer system.
Malware, TECHTERMS.COM, http://techterms.com/definition/malware (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016). 20 SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 11, 17 (2015),
https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-
security-threat-report-volume-20-2015-social v2.pdf.
2. INTEL SECURITY, MCAFEE LAB THREATS REPORT, 31 (2015),
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-aug-2015.pdf.
3. Allison Gual, Neutrality in the Digital Battle Space: Applications of the
Principle of Neutrality in Information Warfare, 29 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP.
51, 53 (2013); Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technology's
Challenge to the Law ofState Responsibility, 14 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 1, 6 (2013).
4. JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 4 (Mike Loukides ed., 2d. ed.
2012).
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service attacks (DDoS)5 against websites of Estonian Government
agencies, political parties, media companies, and financial firms. 6
From 2013 to 2015, a syndicate of cybercriminals repeatedly hacked
over 100 banks around the world, including banks in Britain, stealing
over E650 million what was one of the largest cybercriminal schemes
in history.7  Finally, in late July and early August of 2015, Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) hackers posted the personal identifying
information of some 1,300 military and government employees on
"jihadi forums" and social media sites.8  Each posting included a
message urging ISIS supporters to attack the soldiers whose
information was listed.' This spectrum of malicious cyber activity
illustrates the varied legal challenges cyber attacks pose to the United
States and governments worldwide.'o Moreover, it illustrates how
both state-sponsored and non-state actors use the Internet to perpetrate
wrongful cyber-acts.
5. A distributed denial-of-service attack uses many computers to attack a
single target. The computers are hijacked by a single operator or group of operators
who command them to attack the target. This causes the single target to be shut
down, "thereby denying service to the system to legitimate users." Margaret Rouse,
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), TECHTARGET.COM,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributed-denial-of-service-attack
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
6. Margulies, supra note 3, at 6-7.
7. Martin Evans, Hackers Steal £650 Million in World's Biggest Bank Raid,
THETELEGRAPH.CO.UK (Feb 15, 2015, 4:09 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/1 1414191/Hackers-steal-650-
million-in-worlds-biggest-bank-raid.html.
8. Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, Hacking in the Name of the Islamic State
ISIS, MEMRI JIHAD AND TERRORISM THREAT MONITOR, MEMRIJTTM.ORG (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.memrijttm.org/hacking-in-the-name-of-the-islamic-state-
isis.html; US Airstrike Killed Top ISIL Hacker - CENTCOM,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, (Aug. 28, 2015, 11:26 PM),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2015/08/mil-150828-
sputnik03.htm [hereinafter USAirstrike].
9. Stalinsky & Sosnow, supra note 8.
10. See generally Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 525, 546 (2012) (In cyberspace private non-state actors
"present a complicated issue for targeted states."); Foreign Policy - Cybersecurity,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity
(last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
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This Note will focus on the cyber activities of non-state actors and
the relevant law that can be synthesized into a threat-response
framework for United States law -enforcement and military. "Non-
state actor" is used in this, article to denote "an individual or
organization that' has significant political influence but is not allied to
any particular country or state."" A clear example is ISIS, an
organization that has significant political influence in the Middle
East. 12 However, ISIS is not a governmental organization of a state
recognized by the international community, despite calling themselves
the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria."' 3
International non-state actors present an interesting legal question
for the U.S. Government because, as it stands, the United States is
largely limited in responding to these issues through the domestic
criminal system. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Cyber's Most Wanted list includes individuals like Firas Dardar, a
hacker for the Syrian Electronic Army, and Evgeniy Mikhailovich
Bogachev, a Russian national .who has run notorious financial
schemes. 14 However, these malicious attacks can be launched
remotely from anywhere in the world, and domestic prosecution is not
always an option for international perpetrators. This leaves many
cyber criminals, terrorists, and spies to their devices, costing the
global economy an estimated $455 billion annually.' 5
11. Non-state actor, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com/us/definition/english/non-state-actor (last visited May 29, 2016).
12. See Ben Smith, ISIS and the sectarian conflict in the middle east, Research
Paper 15.16 HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY 14-15 (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/rpl5-16.pdf.
13. See generally id. at 7-10.
14. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Cyber's Most Wanted,
https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); See also Laurie R.
Blank, International Law and Cyber Treats from Non-State Actors 89 INT'L L.
STUD. 406, 407 (2013) (domestic criminal law and national security law are the most
relevant legal regimes governing cyber activity).
15. Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Report: Cybercrime and Espionage
Costs $455 Billion Annually, THEWASHINGTONPOST.COM (June 9, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/report-cybercrime-and-
espionage-costs-445-billion-annually/2014/06/08/8995291 c-ecce- 11 e3-9f5c-
9075d5508f0a_story.html.
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Despite the United States' inability to prosecute international
hackers, "hacking-back" remains a controversial solution.' 6
"Hacking-back" includes a broad range of offensive cyber tactics to
attack attackers." For example, security professionals can set up a
range of automatic or manually initiate responses, called active
defenses, when they experience an attack.1 8 These active defenses can
be thought of as "electronic countermeasures designed to strike
attacking computer systems and shut down cyber attacks
midstream."1 9  Alternatively, security professionals can attach a
"beacon" to sensitive data.20 That way, if the information were stolen,
the beacon would be stolen with it, making it easier for the owner to
find the stolen data in cyberspace. 21 Finally, if circumstances justify
targeting a foreign government's cyber infrastructure, a DDoS attack
could be used to temporarily disable the computer networks in the
state.
Given the controversial nature of hacking-back, and concerns for
escalation, it is essential that there be clear parameters for the action.
Thus, creating a clear framework to determine how to respond to the
range of bad cyber-acts that exist is critical. Clear legal guidelines are
essential to set the limits of government action and to empower
victims of cyber attacks to vindicate their rights. Most importantly, a
threat-response framework must be developed to punish and deter
malicious activity because, should it go unaddressed, it will continue
16. See generally CARR, supra note 4, at 194-96 (discussing baiting techniques
and active defenses that may be used against, attacks on certain sectors of
cyberspace); Craig Timberg, et al., Cyberattacks trigger talk of 'hacking back',
THEWASHINGTONPOsT.COM (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/technology/cyberattacks-trigger-talk-of-hacking-back/2014/10/09/6f0b7
a24-4f02-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b story.html (discussing how "going on the
offensive" is being discussed in cybersecurity circles); Eduard Kovacs, Hacking
Back: Industry Reactions to Offensive Security Research, SECURJTYWEEK.COM
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/hacking-back-industry-reactions-
offensive-security-research (discussing the controversy between cybersecurity
experts with regard to active defenses).
17. See generally CARR, supra note 4, at 194-96; Timberg et al., supra note 16.
18. CARR, supra note 4, at 46 n.2.
19. Id.
20. Timberg et al., supra note 16.
21. Id.
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to cost the global economy billions, jeopardize our national security,
and invade the most intimate aspects of our private lives.
This Note seeks to provide such a framework. Part II will discuss
areas where cyberspace complicates traditional legal schemes. Part III
will break down the spectrum of cyber-based threats into four broad
categories-crime, espionage, warfare, and terrorism-and discuss the
law applicable to each. Particular attention will be given to warfare
and terrorism as these laws are relevant to the example the framework
will be applied to in Part V. Part IV will lay out the threat-response
framework, combining the discrete laws discussed in Part III. Finally,
in Part V, the framework will be applied to the case of an ISIS hacker
to provide an example of how the framework would apply to cyber
terrorism.
II. THE UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES OF CYBERSPACE
Part of the difficulty in developing a clear legal framework stems
from the novel character of cyberspace as compared with the physical
world. The architecture of cyberspace is multi-dimensional like the
physical world, but unlike physical structures which are. relatively
permanent, data structures within cyberspace can be easily altered
within minutes.22 Cyberspace's novelty is evidenced by one
commentator's struggle to define it, settling on cyberspace as "a
malleable realm of transitory data structures in which [real time] is
measured in nanoseconds and spatially exists somehow both globally
and invisibly." 23 In sum, efforts to investigate and reverse-engineer an
attack to identify the attacker are frustrated by sophisticated actors'
ability to alter data and easily hide their tracks. Indeed, there is the
well-recognized issue of the difficulty of determining the identity of
an attacker.24 The real-world equivalent would be something like a
22. See Jack M. Beard, Article: Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The
Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a Target Under Int'l
Humanitarian Law, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 106-07 (2014).
23. SCOTT BUKATMAN, TERMINAL IDENTITY: THE VIRTUAL SUBJECT IN
POSTMODERN SCIENCE FICTION 18 (1993)
24. See Dimitar Kostadinov, The Attribution Problem in Cyber Attacks,
INFOSECINSTITUTE.COM (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/attribution-problem-in-cyber-attacks/.
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super-criminal with the power to open walls as if they were doors and
to shape-shift, taking on the identity of another when desired. Such an
individual might, understandably, evade law enforcement's efforts.
Another aspect of cyberspace that thwarts responses is that the
infrastructure that composes cyberspace is largely privately owned.25
Therefore, governments lack the same kind of control over
information and evidence that they have over physical territory,
objects, and persons in the real world.26 In addition, cyberspace defies
territorial boundaries, challenging principles underlying domestic
governance and international responsibility. 27  For example,
jurisdiction over persons and property is largely based on their
relationship to a physical location.2 8
To understand these problems and some of their plausible
solutions, it is helpful to start at the beginning.
25. See Beard, supra note 22, at 87.
26. See e.g., Robert Chesney and Steve Valdeck, A Coherent Middle Ground
in the Apple-FBI All Writs Act Dispute?, LAWFAREBLOG.ORG (Mar. 21, 2016)
https://www.lawfareblog.com/coherent-middle-ground-apple-fbi-all-writs-act-
dispute (discussing the FBI's legal struggle to compel Apple to comply with a
search warrant to access the phone of a terrorist with ties to ISIS who executed a
deadly attack in San Bernardino on December 2, 2015).
27. See Beard, supra note 22, at 87.
28. See Jurisdiction, Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, in BENCHBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § II.A.1 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014),
www.asil.org/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf (indicating the following five bases of
jurisdiction: (1) "territoriality" which focuses on conduct taking place within a
country's sovereign territory; (2) "nationality" which provides jurisdiction over the
activities of a country's nationals; (3) "passive personality" which provides
jurisdiction over conduct that victimizes a country's nationals; (4) "protective
principle" which focuses on activities against a country's vital interests; and (5)
"universality" which provides jurisdiction over erga omens, or conduct recognized
by all nations as a criminal.) Thus, with the exception of universal, jurisdiction is
inextricably linked to territory in that it is based on an act that occurred in a
country's territory; by one of its nationals [who is often a national by virtue of being
born or residing within a country's territory]; or, by harm to a country's territory or
nationals. See id.
2016] 115
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A. A Brief History of the Internet
In 1967, the DoD built the first network called the Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).2 9 APRANET
began as a small closed-network comprised of only four nodes.30 At
first ARPANET expanded slowly into a patchwork of local, regional,
or private networks." In 1974, Bob Kahn and Vint Cerf introduced a
technology that standardized how users could send information across
networks.32 This allowed the existing isolated networks to connect. 3
Once networks connected, ARPANET grew exponentially. 34  By
1996, the "World Wide Web" was born, bringing with it a handful of
cybersecurity problems. 35  Today, nearly three billion people are
connected to the Internet, and nearly all are vulnerable to cyber
attacks. 36
29. ScoTT J. SHACKELFOLD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, BusiNEss, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 20-21 (2014).
30. See generally SHACKELFOLD, supra note 29, at 21. A closed network is a
network that does not connect with other networks, but rather only allows
recognized participants to connect. See Ken Stanick, Open vs Closed Networks -
What is the difference?, B2BNETWORKSTRATEGY.COM (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://b2bnetworkstrategy.com/2013/04/19/open-vs-closed-networks-what-is-the-
difference/. "Any system or device connected to a network is also called a node.
For example, if a network connects a file server, five computers, and two printers,
there are eight nodes on the network." Node, TECHTERMS.COm,
http://techterms.com/definition/node (last visited May 29, 2016).
31. SHACKELFOLD, supra note 29, at 21.
32. Internet History 1962 to 1992, COMPUTERHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.computerhistory.org/internethistory/1970s/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015)
(explaining that this uniform technology was called Transmission Control Protocol
and the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)) [hereinafter Internet History].
33. SHACKELFOLD, supra note 29, at 21.
34. See generally Internet History, supra note 32.
35. See generally Craig Timberg, Net of Insecurity-A Flaw in the Design,
THEWASHINGTONPOST.COM (May 30, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/30/net-of-insecurity-part-l/.
36. Salvador Rodriguez, 60% of World's Population Still Won't Have Internet
by the End of 2014, LATIMES.COM (May 7, 2014 10:30 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-60-world-population-3-billion-
internet-2014-20140507-story.html.
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Each time the technology behind the Internet advanced and
networks expanded, threats to cybersecurity increased.37 Kahn and
Cerf's technology proved to be inherently insecure. 38 For example,
when users send information, it can travel through any node in the
world to its destination.3 9 Once it arrives, there is no way to be sure
who sent it, whether someone else modified it, or whether anyone
spied on it en route.4 o This insecurity enables a range of malicious
activity, from spying to masking a cybercriminal's identity.4 1
Moreover, just as information is sent, malicious code, or malware, can
also be sent-with little chance of verifying the sender or detecting it
en route. 42
As the software used to program computers advanced, so too did
malware.43 As early as 1982, an early version of a "logic bomb"4
caused a Soviet gas pipeline in Serbia to explode.45  In 1988, the
"Morris Worm" crashed thousands of machines and cost millions in
damage. 4 6 In 2010, a highly sophisticated malware called "Stuxnet"
caused irreversible damage to centrifuges at Iranian nuclear
facilities.47 Today, one of the most common tools of cybercriminals,
known as a "Botnet," allows a single hacker to commandeer millions
of computers and carry out cyber attacks through the commandeered
37. Gervais, supra note 10, at 530.
38. See Tiniberg, supra note 35.
39. SHACKELFOLD, supra note 29, at 118.
40. Id.
41. See generally id. at 119.
42. See Timberg, supra note 35.
43. Gervais, supra note 10, at 530.
44. "A logic bomb is a malicious program timed to cause harm at a certain
point in time, but is inactive up until that point. A set trigger, such as a
preprogrammed date and time, activates a logic bomb. Once activated, a logic bomb
implements a malicious code that causes harm to a computer ... A logic bomb is
also known as slag code." TECHOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4010/logic-bomb (last visited Feb. 27,
2016).
45. Beard, supra note 22, at 79.
46. Timberg, supra note 35.
47. Reese Nguyen, Comment, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber
Warfare, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1079, 1099 (2013).
2016] 117
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computers. 48 Ultimately, we are left with a cyberspace made insecure
by aspirations to facilitate the most efficient exchange of information
possible and a spectrum of actors exploiting those insecurities.
B. Problems with Controlling Cyberspace and the Actors Within it
One of the most challenging aspects of responding to similar
malicious attacks is that, potentially, millions of users share the same
networks at any given time. Public and private; civilian and military;
and the United States and its adversaries all share the same Internet. 49
The communal nature of cyberspace limits possible responses because
some reactions will necessarily interfere with the rights of innocent
parties. This is especially true with Botnets.so Where innocent users'
computers are hijacked to carry out attacks, any response would affect
those computers in an effort to dismantle the Botnet.51  Thus,
particularly for a hack-back response to a cyber-based threat to be
lawful, it must consider how that response will affect innocent parties.
Because many different people and entities use and own the
Internet, the U.S. Government lacks control, let alone a presence in
most of cyberspace. 52 The government's lack of authority is
potentially catastrophic because principles underlying domestic
governance and international responsibility are centered on a
government's ability to exercises sovereign control over its territory.53
Territorial sovereignty carries with it certain privileges and
obligations.54 It empowers countries to prosecute internal threats and
48. Beard, supra note 22, at 76-77.
49. Gervais, supra note 10, at 530.
50. E.g., Sam Zeitlin, Note, Botnet Takedowns and the Fourth Amendment, 90
N.Y.U.L. REV. 746, 748 (2015) (discussing law enforcement efforts to shut down a
Botnet as a violation of users' fourth amendment rights).
51. See Beard, supra note 22, at 76-77.
52. Id. at 87.
53. See CLETE D. JOHNSON, PANELIST, CYBERSECURITY AND NATIONAL
DEFENSE: BUILDING A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, OCCASIONAL PAPERS 15
(Laura Tate Kagel ed., Spring 2015).
54. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Legal Implications of Territorial
Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 7-19, 8
(C. Cozosseck, et al. eds., 2012), http://insct.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/HeineggSovereigntyn_Cyberspace.pdf.
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protect against foreign invaders.5 5  It obligates a country to ensure
actors within its territory do not commit acts that unlawfully interfere
with a foreign country.56
There has been much debate over how the concept of territorial
sovereignty should translate to cyberspace.5  Even if cyberspace
traverses territorial boundaries and is not itself physical, cyberspace
still requires physical equipment in order to exist.58  This physical
architecture is composed of human users, cables, servers, computers,
and other equipment.59 Collectively, this is referred to as
"cyberinfrastructure." 60  It is over cyberinfrastructure that
governments attempt to assert their sovereign control. 1 Indeed, the
Tallinn Manual on the Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn
Manual) and other sources of international law seem to support this
theory.62
Under this theory, the same privileges that allow governments to
prosecute internal threats and protect their territory from foreign
invaders, similarly permit the government to protect its
cyberinfrastructure. Governments exercise their right to prosecute
55. JOHNSON, supra note 53, at 15; Heinegg, supra note 54, at 8.
56. Heinegg, supra note 54, at 8-9.
57. See generally Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It
Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REV 1 (2009); Margulies, supra note 3, at 1; Susan W. Brenner,
Cyber-threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH.
137 (2013).
58. Franzese, supra note 57, at 17.
59. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR
CYBERINFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE ON CAMPuS BRIDGING, FINAL REPORT 3 (Mar.
2011), http://www.nsf.gov/cise/aci/taskforces/TaskForceReport CampusBridging.
pdf ("Cyberinfrastructure consists of computational systems, data and information
management, advanced instruments, visualization environments, and people, all
linked together by software and advanced networks").
60. See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, http://www.nsf.gov/news/
special reports/cyber/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2015).
61. Heinegg, supra note 54, at 10.
62. See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE Rule 2, para. 2 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter
TALLINN].
2016] 119
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cybercriminals who use or interfere with their cyberinfrastructure. 63
Governments have also asserted the right to protect their
cyberinfrastructure against any interference by individuals in foreign
64countries.
However, following this logic, the obligations attached to
territorial sovereignty al3o apply to infrastructure. Thus, a state that
exercises territorial sovereignty over its cyberinfrastructure may be
held responsible for malicious cyber-acts that affect foreign countries.
Commentators who argue for a "sanctuary theory" of liability contend
that the international community may hold a state responsible for
cyber attacks continuously launched from its cyberinfrastructure.65 In
effect, governments are obligated to take precautionary measures to
ensure their portion of cyberspace does not provide a "sanctuary" for
hostile cyber activities.66 Both the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
jurisprudence and the Tallinn Manual seem to support this theory of
liability in cases where the state knows, or in some circumstances
should have known, of the malicious activity.67  Considering these
conditions are met, the country from which malicious cyber activity
emanates may be held accountable.
C. Issues with Anonymity and Attribution
The final notable challenge to responding to cyber-based threats is
the difficulty in identifying the attacker. Anonymity is the
63. Heinegg, supra note 54, at 9. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011) (U.S.
domestic criminal law on cybercrime, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); See
Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185
(multilateral treaty on cybercrime that forty-seven countries have ratified).
64. Heinegg, supra note 54, at 10.
65. Beard, supra note 22, at 87-88 (internal quotation omitted); Nguyen, supra
note 47, at 1104. E.g., David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87, 92-96 (2010).
66. See Beard, supra note 22, at 87-88.
67. See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 18 (Apr. 9);
TALLINN, supra note 62, Rule 5 ("A state shall not knowingly allow the cyber
infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to
be used for act that adversely and unlawfully affect other States.").
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"cornerstone of Internet culture." 68 Users commonly use aliases and
download free software to mask their identity.6 9 In cyberspace, there
are many ways to hide who you are. A simple way to mask identity is
to register for services using false information, making it so that your
online activity is not connected to your real personal identifying
information. Another way to hide your identity is to mask the address
that uniquely identifies your device-the IP address. 70 Still another
way is to use "Tor" software which allows users to access an
encrypted layer within the Internet, often referred to as the "Dark
Web" or "Deep Web."" Finally, there is always the option of routing
the attack and acting through another user's computer and identity,72
an act known as "spoofing."73
Anonymity complicates response schemes because the first step in
responding to any cyber attack is to find out who executed it and
where it came from.74 Computer specialists and experts are working
to develop better methods for identifying the sources of attacks. 75
However, the dark heart of the Internet breeds ambiguity and
anonymity. This is problematic because the identity of the actor and
68. David Davenport, Anonymity on the Internet: Why the Price May be Too
High, 45 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 33, 33 (Apr. 2002),
http://www.csl.mtu.edu/cs6461/www/Reading/Davenport02.pdf
69. See generally Jonha Ravesencio, Understanding the Benefits and Limits of
Internet Anonymity, THEHUFFINGTONPOsT.COM (Oct. 15, 2015 2:34 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonha-revesencio/understanding-the-benefit-b_
8305984.html; TOR, https://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
70. See MASKMYIP.COM, http://www.mask-myip.com/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2015).
71. Matt Egan, What is The Dark Web? How to Access the Dark Web. What's
the Difference Between the Dark Web and the Deep Web, PCADvIsOR.CO.UK (Nov.
23, 2015), http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/how-to/internet/what-is-dark-web-how-
access-dark-web-deep-joc-3593569/; see also TOR, https://www.torproject.org/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2015).
72. See Beard, supra note 22, at 76-77.
73. Spoofing, TECHOPEDIA.COM, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5398/
spoofing (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
74. Margulies, supra note 3, at 7-8.
75. Beard, supra note 22, at 75-76.
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the actor's motive are crucial to electing a lawful response, as will
become evident in the discussion below.7 6
The fact that actors are difficult to identify once they have
perpetrated an attack, coupled with the U.S. Government's limited
ability to control bad-actors and prevent damage to innocent parties,
justifies a hack-back response. If the actor cannot be identified after
the attack, no response can be taken. This justifies attaching a beacon
to data so that it and its captor are easier to find after the fact.
Alternatively, if the attack can be detected in real-time, deploying
electronic countermeasures to automatically shut down an attack
midstream would be justified because it may be the only opportunity
to respond to the attack. Unfortunately, the legality of these responses
remains controversial under domestic an international law. n One
reason is that hacking-back involves measures that affect computer
networks belonging to both culpable and innocent actors.7 ' Another
reason is because the actual act of hacking-back is, in essence, a cyber
attack and the line between what is and is not a lawful attack in
response is not at all clear.79 Thus, such a response, if not carefully
articulated by both domestic and international law, risks escalation
and may overall be counter-productive to achieving greater cyber
security.
III. THE LAW RELEVANT TO CYBER-BASED ACTIVITIES
The United States has been developing domestic law to address
cyber-based activities since 1986.80 As for international law,
76. Margulies, supra note 3, at 8 ("Identifying the source of harm is crucial for
the allocation of legal consequences.").
77. See generally CARR, supra note 4, at 46-47; Timberg et al., supra note 16;
Kovacs, supra note 16.
78. Kovacs, supra note 16 (Attackers using hijacked computers constantly
"change through multiple compromised computers to ensure their identities and
locations remain unknown. This creates a big problem for hacking back. Although
the attack may have been tracked to a certain computer, that computer is probably
owned and used by some innocent party; a previous victim of the same hacker.").
79. See generally CARR, supra note 4, at 46-47; Kovacs, supra note 16.
80. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMEs 1 (2015) (noting that with the dawn
of the computer age in the early 1980s, law enforcement struggled to prosecute
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President Barack Obama and the DoD have made clear that "[l]ong-
standing international norms ... apply in cyberspace."8 1 However,
existing laws provide incomplete and insufficient remedies to address
the full spectrum of cyber attacks committed by non-state actors.
Cyber activities can be broken down into four general categories:
crime, espionage, warfare, and terrorism. 82  Currently, cyber-acts
within these categories are largely being addressed by merely tacking
on the existing law applicable to their respective real-world
counterparts. 83 In the real world what constitutes crime, espionage,
warfare, and terrorism is relatively well established. 84 However, this
is not true of their cyber complements.8 5 Therefore, applying existing
laws, while sometimes effective, will not always be.
The following categories broadly define different cyber activities,
focusing on their distinguishing factors. Within each category, the
relevant law is discussed to identify existing laws that may be
synthesized to formulate a threat-response framework. It is important
to note that non-state actors' cyber-based activities may not neatly fall
into only one category, but may, in fact, bleed into others. Therefore,
the following categories are meant to broadly encompass the activities
described within them-they are not exhaustive or all-inclusive, but
computer crimes, prompting Congress to create a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1030)
[hereinafter PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES].
81. U.S. PRESIDENT BARAK OBAMA, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CYBERSPACE, PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 9
(2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/international
strategyfor cyberspace.pdf. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE
POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 943, 5-9 (Nov. 2011).
82. Most commentators break cyber-based activities into these four categories
and attempt to define the kinds of activities encompassed in each category.
However, the categories remain unsettled, and are used here to set the parameters of
the threat-response framework contemplated by this Note. See generally Brenner,
supra note 57.
83. Brenner, supra note 57, at 144. (The categories tack on to their real-world
counterparts. In the real-world "the categories evolved as pragmatic responses to
the challenges [States] must confront and overcome if they are to survive.").
84. Id.
85. See Brenner, supra note 57, at 145-46.
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provide a starting point to understand the type of activity each
category addresses.
A. Cyber Crime
Conventional crime is an act committed by an individual that a
government criminalizes and punishes under domestic law.8 6 The
U.S. Department of Justice broadly defines cyber crime as "any
violation of criminal law that involve[s] a knowledge of computer
technology for their perpetration, investigation, or prosecution."8 7
Historically, cyber-acts have been treated as criminal matters
rather than acts of espionage, warfare, or terrorism." One reason for
this is that criminal cyber-acts share features of many other cyber-
based threats. 89 However, cyber crime can typically be distinguished
as activity perpetrated by non-state actors exploiting financial data.90
As to criminal matters, governments have largely responded to
cyber crime with domestic prosecution. 91  The United States
criminalizes cyber crime under a few statutes, most notably the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Title 18 of the United States Code,
section 1030 (CFAA).9 2 The current CFAA is extremely broad
because it has grown in response to concerns about the lack of "laws
available to fight emerging computer crimes," and as cyber crime has
grown in sophistication and complexity, so too has the statute. 93 it
includes nearly every computer-related activity, provides civil and
criminal remedies, and permits territorial and extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
86. See id ("A crime consists of violating a rule-a law-that prohibits
certain conduct or causing certain 'harm' . . . [The criminal] system assumes
individuals commit crimes.").
87. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCES MANUAL 2 (1989); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 427 (9th ed. 2009) (defining computer crimes as "[a] crime involving
the use of a computer").
88. See CARR, supra note 4, at 62.
89. See Beard, supra note 22, at 131.
90. Beard, supra note 22, at 131.
91. See Heinegg, supra note 54, at 9.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011).
93. See generally PROSECUTING OFFICE CRIMES, supra note 80.
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Essentially every kind of cyber act could be prosecuted
domestically under the CFAA. For example, section 1030(a)(3)
criminalizes unauthorized access to nearly any computer. 9 4 Sections
1030(a)(1) and (a)(2) criminalize unauthorized access to a computer to
obtain or transmit classified or protected government information. 95
Acts that cause physical damage to computers can be prosecuted
under 1030(a)(5). 96 Further, cyber terrorism can be prosecuted under
Title 18 of the United States Code, section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), which
specifically reference sections 1030(a)(1), 1030(a)(5)(A), and
1030(c)(4)(A). 97  While the CFAA provides these options for
domestic prosecution, bringing international offenders to justice
within the United States is easier in theory than in practice.
B. Cyber Espionage
Espionage has primarily been a government-on-government affair
since time immemorial, but, recently, corporate, industrial, and
economic espionage have become prevalent. 98  Broadly defined,
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (2011) ("Whoever... intentionally, without
authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the
United States. . . or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used
by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by
of for the Government of the United States.").
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(1)-(2) (2011).
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5) (2011) ("(A) knowingly causes the transmission
of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct,
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (B)
intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of
such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (C) intentionally accesses a protected
computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and
loss").
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (2011).
98. Espionage can be linked back to Sun Tzu's Art of War. SUN TZu, THE
ART OF WAR 145 (513 B.C.). Chapter 13 specifically refers to "The Use of Spies."
Id.; see generally Noah Leavitt, Sun Tzu and the Art of Spying, ALTERNET.ORG (Jan.
4, 2006), http://www.altemet.org/story/30394/suntzuandtheartof spying (last
visited Mar. 2, 2016). As of 2013, Symantec estimated cyber economic espionage
accounted for some $250 billion a year in intellectual property theft. Pierluigi
Paganini, Cyber-Espionage: The Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History,
INFOSECINSTITUTE.COM (Feb. 12, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cyber-
2016] 125
126 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
espionage is the "deceitful collection of information, ordered by a
government or organization hostile to or suspicious of those the
information concerns, accomplished by humans unauthorized by the
target to do the collecting." 99
Cyber espionage may be defined as the "unauthorized probing to
test a target computer's configuration or evaluate its system defenses,
or the unauthorized viewing and copying of data files." 00 Cyber
espionage does not greatly differ from conventional espionage: both
target the same kind of information for the same purpose. What
remains critical to the act being characterized as espionage is that
some foreign government or instrumentality is involved in the act.'o
Where cyber espionage differs is that a vast amount of information
can easily be acquired from a remote location. 102 For example, a spy
no longer needs to infiltrate a foreign government office and rummage
through filling cabinets for state secrets. He may access those secrets
from halfway across the world, safely out of the target state's reach.
Despite espionage's international component, international law
does not address espionage.10 3 Rather, espionage is proscribed under
domestic law.1 04 Title 18 of the United States Code, sections 794,
1831, and 1832 criminalize espionage.' Specifically, section 794(a)
espionage-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
McAfee estimated the global impact at $1 trillion per year. Id.
99. Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 325-26 (1996).
100. Clay Wilson, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME AND
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (2008)
[hereinafter CRS, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORISM].
101. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-799 (2011); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1837 (2011).
102. Neil Webb, A New Age of Espionage, THEECONOMIST.COM (Aug. 1,
2015) http://www.economist.com/news/international/21660104-electronic-spycraft-
getting-easier-more-controversial-old-style-human-sort (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
103. Beard, supra note 22, at 114.
104. Demarest, supra note 99, at 331; e.g. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, TITLE
9: CRIMINAL, 9-59.000. JUSTICE.GOv, http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-59000-
economic-espionage (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) ("evidence of involvement by a
foreign government, foreign agent or foreign instrumentality" is a factor considered
in deciding whether to prosecute economic espionage).
105. Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-799 (2011); Espionage Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. §§831-1837 (2011).
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forbids gathering information with the intent to transmit that
information to a foreign government, to the benefit of that government
or the detriment of the United States. 10 6  Economic espionage is
criminalized under sections 1831 and 1832, which prohibit stealing,
copying, downloading, uploading, or conveying any trade secret
(1831) or information (1832) for the benefit of a foreign government
or instrumentality.107 Both individuals and organizations can be
penalized for economic espionage. 0 8
Sections 749, 1831, and 1832 have language that translates well to
cyber espionage and are applicable without modification.
Specifically, these sections already address transmitting information
and do not limit the mode of transmission.1 09 Thus, stealing and
transmitting information in cyberspace may be domestically
prosecuted under these sections.
Non-state actors who steal government information or intellectual
property can also be prosecuted as cybercriminals.11 0 This is because
a cyber attack that gains unauthorized access to another computer to
view or copy information would also be in violation of the CFAA. In
such circumstances, spies can be prosecuted under either the statutory
provisions relevant to espionage or under the CFAA. However, there
will again remain the issue of whether domestic prosecution is a
viable remedy. Given that it is foreign actors who engage in
espionage, a logical inference can be made that most spies will go
unprosecuted.
106. 18 U.S.C. §794(a) (2011) ("Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that
it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits. .. to any foreign government. . . shall
be punished. . .").
107. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1837 (2011).
108. 18 USC § 1831 (2011).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2011) (transmits or attempts to communicate
information through any signal or instrument); 18 U.S.C. §1831(a)(2) (2011)
(copies, downloads, uploads, alters, transmits, delivers, sends, communicates or
conveys); 18 U.S.C. §1832(a)(2) (2011) (same).
110. CRS, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORISM, supra note 100, at
12-13.
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C. Cyber Warfare
Throughout history, warfare and armed conflict involved one
country's military pitted against another's." The contemporary
battlefield is changing, but it remains controversial whether non-state
actors are capable of waging war. 112  Warfare is defined as the
"military operations between enemies . . . undertaken by [one nation]
to weaken or destroy another."'l 3 Indeed, both U.S. domestic law and
international law governing warfare focus primarily on a country's
military activities.114
The DoD has stated that international legal norms governing
armed conflicts apply in cyberspace.115 The International Committee
of the Red Cross defines cyber warfare as follows:
[O]perations against or via a computer or a computer system. . .
[which] aim to infiltrate a system and collect, export, destroy,
change, or encrypt data or to trigger, alter or otherwise manipulate
processes controlled by the infiltrated computer system. By these
means, a variety of "targets" in the real world can be destroyed,
altered or disrupted, such as industries, infrastructures,
telecommunications, or financial systems.116
111. See generally Military History Encyclopedia on the Web,
HISTORYOFWAR.ORG, http://www.historyofwar.org/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2015).
112. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Int'l Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict 42, Al Index EN 31IC/11/5.1.2
(Geneva Oct. 2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-
movement/31st-intemational-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-
5-1-2-en.pdf [hereinafter Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts].
International Humanitarian Law applies to civilians in situations where they directly
participate in hostilities. However, generally speaking, non-state actors do not wage
war. See Emily Crawford, Virtual Battlegrounds: Direct Participation in Cyber
Warfare 9 I/S J. OF L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (Spring 2013).
113. Warfare, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/warfare (last visited Nov. 26, 2015).
114. See Beard, supra note 22, at 83.
115. Beard, supra note 22, at 69 n. 5.
116. Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, supra note 112, at 36.
HACK AND BE HACKED
While this definition seems incredibly broad, acts of war, such as
armed attacks, are similarly broadly understood as discussed below in
this section.
Cyber warfare differs from crime and espionage in that cyber
warfare only covers a small section of attacks that can be considered
either armed attacks or cyber operations committed by a nation's
military forces during a period of armed conflict.1 17 In other words,
only where the scale and effects of an act of cyber crime or cyber
espionage is sufficiently severe will it fall under the umbrella of cyber
warfare.
Law governing warfare is divided into two broad areas: jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum governs the transition from
peace to war." 8  Jus in bello, or International Humanitarian Law
(IHL) regulates wartime conduct.11 9 For IHL to be applicable, either
an "international armed conflict" or , "non-international armed
conflict" must be in progress. 120
Jus ad bellum refers specifically to what must happen before a
country may lawfully resort to armed force. 12 1 The United Nations
Charter (U.N. Charter or Charter) is the starting point for these
conditions.1 22 Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the "use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
117. See CARR, supra note 4, at 48.
118. Id.
119. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, What are Jus adBellum and Jus in Bello?,
ICRC.ORG (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-
bellum-and-jus-bello-O [hereinafter ICRC, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello].
120. Beard, supra note 22, at 82.
121. ICRC, Jus adBellum andJus in Bello, supra note 119.
122. See id. While the Charter is binding only on members of the United
Nations, the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4)) and right to self-defense
(Article 51) are generally accepted and represents customary international law,
binding on all states regardless of U.N. membership. U.N. Charter, art. 2, 1. 4; U.N.
Charter, art. 51. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicar. V. U.S.].
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state...."l23 Only where the use of force rises to the level of an
"armed attack" may a state respond with military action in kind. 124
However, the Charter does not define "force" or "armed
attack." 125 The ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua explains it is the "scale and effects" of the force
that determine whether it constitutes an armed attack justifying a
state's recourse to armed force. 126 At minimum, "force" and "armed
attack" include conventional armed force employed by a nation's
military.1 2 7 On the other end of the spectrum are coercive forces like
espionage and economic or political sanctions.1 2 8 Article 2(4) does
not prohibit these forms of "force" even though they may interfere
with another country's sovereignty. 129
There are several analytical approaches to determining when a
cyber attack is an armed attack, and thus, an unlawful use of force. 130
123. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4.
124. U.N. Charter, art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs....").
125. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 122, ¶ 176. "Armed attacks" are referred to in
the U.N. Charter as acts that "authorize the 'inherent right' of self-defense, but the
Charter provides no definition for 'armed attack."' Id.
126. Id. ¶ 195.
127. Nguyen, supra note 47, at 1114.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also TALLMN, supra note 67, Rule 11, paras. 10-11.
130. The common approaches for analyzing cyber attacks are: (1) the
"instrument-based approach" which looks to whether the form of weapon used to
carry out the attack is like the "physical characteristics traditionally associated with
military coercion" (Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1023, 1041 (2007); see also
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International
Law, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 272, 289 (1996)), (2) the "target-based or strict-liability
approach" which focuses on the attack's target (Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need
an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1023,
1041 (2007); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87, 91 (2010); Eric T. Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical
National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38
STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 228-31 (2002)) (3) the effects- or consequence based
approach which is discussed in this Note; and (4) the cyber-physical system
approach which holds a cyber attack constitutes an armed attack when it cases
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The consequentialist approach or effects-based approach is the leading
view among experts and is prevalent among the United States'
analysis of cyber actions. 13 1 This approach looks at the consequences
of the cyber attack in determining how to categorize it. 132
Cybersecurity analyst and expert Jeffery Carr adopted
international-law-scholar Michael N. Schmitt's widely-employed
consequentialist framework for analyzing when a cyber attack
constitutes an armed attack. 133  Schmitt's six criteria are severity,
immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive
legitimacy. 134
(1) Severity looks to whether the attack caused physical injury
or destroyed property. The greater the damage, the more
likely the cyber attack was an armed attack.
(2) Immediacy looks to whether the attack occurred "with great
immediacy" or developed slowly. The negative effects of
armed force require an immediate armed response in self-
defense. Where an attack develops slowly, it is more likely
to resemble a lesser form of force and the targeted state or
international community have an opportunity to resolve the
issue peacefully. Thus, there is less justification for
treating the attack as an armed attack.
(3) Directness looks to whether the attack directly caused the
consequences. The more contributory factors at play, the
less likely the attack was an armed attack.
(4) Invasiveness looks to whether the attack physically or
electronically crossed international borders and caused
harm within a targeted country. The greater the intrusion
into the targeted country's rights, the more it looks like an
armed attack.
irreversible damage to a physical system controlled by computers. Nguyen, supra
note 47, at 1084.
131. Beard, supra note 22, at 115-116; Nguyen, supra note 47, at 1122.
132. Beard, supra note 22, at 115-116; Nguyen, supra note 47, at 1122.
133. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA J. OF
TRAN'L L. 885, 913-15 (1999). Cf CARR, supra note 4, at 60-61; Gervais, supra
note 9, at 539; Nguyen, supra note 43, at 1122-24.
134. CARR, supra note 4, at 61 citing Schmitt, supra note 133, at 913-15.
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(5) Measurability looks to the quantifiable damage caused by
the cyber attack. The greater the demonstrable harm, the
more likely the attack was armed attack.
(6) Presumptive legitimacy looks to whether domestic or
international law treats the activity as presumptively lawful.
This factor examines state practice and international norms.
The less the attack conforms to accepted state practice, the
more likely it was an armed attack. 135
If the cyber attack does not fit the criteria, military action is an
inappropriate response. When more of the factors are satisfied,
proportional and necessary military force in self-defense may be
justified. 136
Once armed conflict has broken out, jus in bello controls
combatants' conduct. Jus in bello is governed by a combination of
treaties.' 37 Under IHL, four basic principles dictate responses:
(1) The principle of discrimination requires attacks never be
directed against civilian objects.
(2) The principle of distinction requires attacks to distinguish
between civilian and military objects.
(3) The principle of proportionality requires attacks not cause
injury or damage to civilian objects in excess of the
concrete and direct military advantage to be gained.
(4) The principle of precautionary measures requires those
responsible for planning and carrying out attacks take
measures to ensure the operations adhere to the principles
of distinction and proportionality.1 3 8
Any cyber operations carried out during armed conflict would also
have to abide by these principles. In other words, countries would
have to respond to cyber attacks with these principles in mind.
135. CARR, supra note 4, at 61; Schmitt, supra note 133, at 913-15.
136. CARR, supra note 4, at 61; Schmitt, supra note 133, at 913-15.
137. See generally Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary IHL-Helping to
Improve the Protections of Victims of Armed Conflict, ICRC.ORG (July 19, 2014),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2014/07-29-customary-
intemational-humanitarian-law-cihl.htm.
138. Beard, supra note 22, at 81-82.
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As an aside, law governing warfare is set out here because it
dictates responses by the U.S. military. Moreover, jus ad bellum and
jus in bello are important because, depending on the intensity and
severity of a cyber attack, military action may be justified. While
non-state actors are not necessarily considered here to wage war, their
malicious cyber activities may be comparable to acts of cyber warfare.
In such cases, this paper contemplates non-state actors' activities as
either criminal or terrorist acts. Thus, it is under either of these
categories acts that could otherwise be considered warfare are
accounted for.
D. Cyber Terrorism
Cyber terrorism represents an intersection between cyber crime
and warfare. While terrorist acts may be violent and give way to
armed conflict, non-state actors are not traditionally "understood to be
capable of committing acts of war."1 39 The ongoing conflict between
a U.S.-led coalition and terrorist organizations in the Middle East may
be challenging this notion. 140 However, as it stands, where terrorists
carry out armed attacks or participate in hostilities during a period of
armed conflict, they are not considered soldiers fighting a war, but
civilians committing acts of terrorism.1 41  Therefore, acts of cyber
terrorism are not considered acts of cyber warfare.
Acts of cyber terrorism can be considered acts of cyber crime,
however. Like cyber crime, cyber terrorism is carried out by
139. Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D. N.Y. 2012). See also
Gervais, supra note 10, at 546.
140. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Int'l Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 31st Int'l Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva 42 (Oct. 2011),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/3 1 st-intema
tional-conference/3 1 -int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-1 1-5-1-2-en.pdf
[hereinafter Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts]. There are instances
where International Humanitarian Law applies to civilian. This is where they
"directly participate in hostilities." See Emily Crawford, Virtual Battlegrounds:
Direct Participation in Cyber Warfare 9 I/S JOURNAL OF LAW & POL'Y 1, 3 (Spring
2013). However, generally speaking, non-state actors do not wage war.
141. Id.
2016] 133
134 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
individuals or groups.1 42 Moreover, the way current U.S. legislation
deals with terrorism leads directly to prosecution under the CFAA, as
is discussed below in this section. The United States defines terrorism
under two categories-domestic and international. The difference
between the two is where the terrorist acts occurred. Domestic
terrorism is defined as:
activities that involve acts dangerous to human lives that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States ... intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of
the government ... and occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.'14
International terrorism is similarly defined, but difers in that it occurs
"primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction or the United States, or
transcends national boundaries . . . ."'"
Cyber terrorism covers actions taken by both domestic terrorists,
often referred to as Hacktivists,1 45 and international terrorist like
ISIS.146 Cyber terrorism has been defined as "any premeditated,
politically motivated attack against information, computer systems,
computer programs, and data which results in violence against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."l 47
142. The criminal justice system is predicated on societal norms that
discourages individuals from acting in certain way. Criminal justice does not have
an eye on regulating behaviors between sovereign states. Rather, "[t]his system
assumes individuals commit crimes. That assumption also applies to terrorism,
which consists of committing what would otherwise be routine crime(s) but for
ideological reasons." Brenner, supra note 57, at 145-46.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2011).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2011).
145. Gervais, supra note 10, at 546 ("Hacktivists are usually private citizens
motivated by nationalistic or ideological feelings who possess sufficient skill to
participate in a cyberattack.").
146. In this paper, hacktivists and cyber terrorism will not be used
synonymously. Rather, cyberterrorists will refer specifically to hackers who attack
on behalf of a transnational terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda or ISIS.
147. Sue Marquette Poremba, Cyber terrorist threats loom 10 years after 9/11,
NBCNEWS.COM (last updated Sep. 6, 2011, 5:40 PM),
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One possible response to cyber attacks that may be categorized as
acts of cyber terrorism is domestic prosecution. As indicated, there is
significant overlap between cyber crime and cyber terrorism. In fact,
cyber terrorism is currently criminalized under the same statute that
criminalizes cyber crime. Title 18 of the United States Code, sections
2331 to 2339, provide for domestic prosecution for a spectrum of
terrorist activities. 14 8 Within these sections, section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i)
explicitly refers to computer crimes under the CFFA.1 4 9  Section
2332b(e) even provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons who
violate these laws.1 50  Thus, both domestic and international
cyberterrorists can be prosecuted domestically under these sections.
However, these sections do not govern military action against
international terrorists.
It is not clear under what circumstances the government may
respond to international acts of cyber terrorism with armed force. The
law governing the current "Global War on Terror" is not an extension
of domestic criminal law, but seems to be governed by a series of ad
hoc decisions.' 5 ' After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress's
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) gave the
President legal authority to use armed force against the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda.15 2  Additionally, a few sources of international law
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44415109/ns/technologyand-science-security/t/cyber-
terrorist-threats-loom-years-after/#.ViKzStKrRpg.
148. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339 (2011); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333.
149. See 18 U.S.C. §2332b(g)(5)(B) (2011) (referring to the "federal crime of
terrorism" as any violation of 18 USC §§ 1030(a)(1), (a)(5)(A) [Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act: relating to protection of computers], resulting in damage as defined
in 1030(c)(4)(A) [relating to protection of computers] among others).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(e) (2011).
151. The War on Terror describes the United States' "military efforts against
in insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq (which can be viewed as fronts in the larger
Global War on Terror) and the global insurgency being waged by the al Qaeda
terrorist network." Donald J. Reed, Why Strategy Matter in the War on Terror, 2
HOMELAND SEC. AFF. 10 (2006), available at https://www.hsaj.org/articles/685. See
also Guy Raz, Defining the War on Terror, NPR (Nov. 1, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6416780.
152. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). There was a second AUMF against
Iraq in 2002. This resolution is not included within the scope of this argument as it
authorized use of force against a State. See H.J. Res 114, 107th Cong. (2002).
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provided a legal basis for the United States to deploy its military to
combat terrorists. 153 However, Congress never officially declared war
against the groups and never extended the AUMF to include ISIS. 154
Additionally, determining which regime of international law
would apply to military action against terrorist acts, including those
committed in cyberspace, is controversial. This is largely because of
the significant classification problems of non-state actors, which arise
under the law of war.155 The United States' Global War on Terror is a
kind of quasi-war, often classified as a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC), in spite of the fact that the conflict is transnational. 156
A NIAC occurs when a State is fighting non-state groups. 57  For
some time, NIAC has applied to instances of armed conflict against
domestic terrorism.158  An example is when a government fights
153. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339 (2011); e.g., International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Jan. 12, 1998); International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999); S. Con. Res. 1373
(Sept. 28, 2001); S. Con. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
154. Russell -Berman, The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-
war-against-isis-will-go-undeclared/390618/. See generally Tanya Somanader, The
Authorization of Military Force Against ISIL Terrorists: What you need to Know,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/1 1/authorization-military-force-against-
isil-terrorists-what-you-need-know.
155. See Beard, supra note 22, at 84.
156. There have been questions about how to categorize the "War on Terror"
(WOT). Some argue the WOT "is not an armed conflict." International
Humanitarian Law Overview, Int'l Justice Res. Ctr,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/intemational-humanitarian-law/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015)
[hereinafter International Humanitarian Law Overview]. The United States seems
content with this claim, categorizing WOT as a political, symbolic war. See
generally Guy Raz, Defining the War on Terror, NPR (Nov. 1, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6416780; but see John C.
Yoo and James C. Ho, International Law and the War on Terrorism,
BERKELEYLAW.EDU (Aug. 1, 2003 11:47 AM),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/yoonyucombatants.pdf. In 2001, President Bush
concluded the "attacks of September 11 placed the United States in a state of armed
conflict, to which the laws of war apply." Id.
157. International Humanitarian Law Overview, supra note 156.
158. See id.; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Unit for Relations with Armed and
Security Forces, Lesson 10: The Law of Armed Conflict - Non-international Armed
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armed dissidents within its territory. 159 In such circumstances, the
conflict is not governed by the law of war, but by a handful of
provisions that ensure the government does not violate individuals'
human rights.' 6 0 The complication here arises from the fact that the
United States is not fighting armed terrorists or cyberterrorists within
its territory. Rather, the conflict is international. However,
classification problems also exist when attempting to term the conflict
international because an international armed conflict (IAC) can "only
be between two or more [s]tates."' 6 ' IACs are governed by jus in
bello as discussed above in the previous section on cyber warfare, and,
as indicated, non-state actors are not traditionally understood to be
capable of engaging in war.' 6 2
One solution is to extend the United States' current doctrine for
international terrorism to include international acts of cyber terrorism.
The United States has developed the "unwilling and unable" test to
justify using armed force against terrorist groups located within other
countries. 163 Under the unwilling and unable test, where country X
suffers an armed attack by a non-state group, country X may use force
in country Y against the group if country Y is unwilling or unable to
suppress the threat. 16 4 Thus, where a cyberterrorist carries out a cyber
attack comparable to an armed attack, responding with armed force
may be justified under the unwilling and unable standard.
Additionally, this standard could also be extended to allow for
responses to any act of cyber terrorism, not with armed force, but with
a proportional countermeasure. In other words, to justify hacking-
back.
Conflict 2 (June 2002), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/lawl 0_final.pdf
[hereinafter The Law ofArmed Conflict - Non-international Armed Conflict].
159. International Humanitarian Law Overview, supra note 156; The Law of
Armed Conflict - Non-international Armed Conflict, supra note 158, at 2.
160. See International Humanitarian Law Overview, supra note 156; The Law
ofArmed Conflict - Non-international Armed Conflict, supra note 158, at 4.
161. International Humanitarian Law Overview, supra note 156.
162. See Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 140;
Crawford, supra note 140, at 3.
163. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a
Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483
(2012).
164. Id at 486.
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IV. THE THREAT-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK
As the above discussion makes clear, current legal solutions to the
variety of cyber-acts a victim may experience exist in discrete bodies
of law. However, in cyberspace acts of cyber crime, espionage,
warfare, and terrorism exist concurrently and often intersect.
Moreover, cyber attacks are not always neatly addressed by one body
of law. Therefore, synthesizing these discrete categories is essential to
providing U.S. law enforcement or military with an appropriate
response framework to counter and deter malicious cyber activities.
The following methodology is one plausible response to cyber-
based threats. The framework incorporates an option to hack-back for
instances where domestic prosecution is unavailable. It begins the
moment the cyber attack occurs and ends the moment a response is
elected. Importantly, if a hack-back response is justified it must be
proportionate to the attack experienced and must minimize collateral
damage to innocent parties. A hack-back response risks escalating as
opposed to deescalating situations and if too severe, risks being an
unlawful cyber act itself. Therefore, it is critical that such a response
is used cautiously and abides by the principles of proportionality and
necessity.
To begin, an attack occurs. Can the identity of the actor or origin
of attack be determined? If neither can, then no response may be
taken because it is impossible to know who or what to respond to. On
the other hand, if only the origin may be determined, a hack-back
response may be justified against the country under the sanctuary
theory.1 65 Thus, the state's computer networks may be temporarily
disabled or permanently destroyed depending on the severity of the
attack the victim state experienced; the damage that innocent parties
will suffer; and, the advantage sought to be gained by hacking-back.
165. See Beard, supra note 22, at 87-88 (describing the sanctuary theory).
This justification, in international law is well founded, beginning with the Corfu
Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 18 (Apr. 9), and recently adopted by the
TALLINN, supra note 67, Rule 5, which indicates that, "a state shall not knowingly
allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive
governmental control to be used for act that adversely and unlawfully affect other
States."
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If the cyber attack is an armed attack under Carr-Schmitt's six criteria,
responding with military force may be justified.166
On the other hand, if the actor's identity can be determined, is
domestic prosecution available? If so, then the individual could be
prosecuted under the relevant domestic law or CFAA provision.1 67 if
domestic prosecution is unavailable, does the attack constitute an
armed attack under Carr-Schmitt's six criteria? If not, the justified
response is to hack-back with beaconing or electronic
countermeasures against the actor. For example, the attack could be
shut down midstream, if possible. Alternatively, the individual's
access to the internet could be restricted or his device effectively
destroyed. If the actor is located in the territory of a state where the
sanctuary theory is applicable, then that state's computer networks
may be temporarily disabled. If, on the other hand, the cyber attack
was an armed attack, military retaliation could be appropriate against
the individual under the unwilling and unable standard or against the
state if the sanctuary theory applies.
For more clarity, Figure 1 on the next page lays out the definition,
key distinguishing factors, and relevant law for each category of cyber
attack. The responses are then set out to address low-to-high intensity
cyber attacks. Where there is less damage, a lower intensity solution
is more appropriate. Where the damage the cyber activity causes is
extensive, a high intensity response is justified. As an aside, warfare
is not set out in its own category here because non-state actors are not
encompassed in the laws of war. Rather, this paper contemplates non-
state actors' armed activities as either criminal or terrorist acts. Thus,
it is under either of these categories acts that could otherwise be
considered warfare are accounted for.
166. See CARR, supra note 4, at 61; Schmitt, supra note 133, at 913-15.
167. For cybercrime, the individual could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§1030 (the CFAA); for cyber espionage 18 U.S.C. §§ 794, 1831, and 1832; and, for
cyber terrorism 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), which specifically reference
§ § 1030(a)(1), 1030(a)(5)(A), and 1030(c)(4)(A).
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Figure 1: A Framework for Assessing the United States' Responses to
Non-state Actors' Cyber-Based Activities
Cyber-Based Distinguishing Low-Level Mid-Level High-Level
Activity Characteristics Response Response Response
Crime Any violation of Domestic Hack-Back: Hack-Back:
criminal law criminal Electronic Destroy the devices
that involves the prosecution countermeasures to associated with the actor.
use of computer under stop the attack OR
technology to 18 U.S.C. § midstream, or Sanctuary Theory:
exploit financial 1030. block the accounts Target the state's
data purely for or device(s) cyberinfrastructure with a
the sake of associated with the DDoS attack. The force
criminal actor. used must not rise to the
enterprise. level of "armed attack"
under Carr-Schmitt's six
criteria.
Espionage Deceitful Domestic Hack-Back: Hack-Back:
collection of criminal Set beacon on Destroy the devices
valuable or prosecution sensitive data, and associated with the actor.
sensitive under then remove data OR
information by 18 U.S.C. §§ from computer Sanctuary Theory:
someone 794 system it is later Target the state's
unauthorized to (espionage) or found on. cyberinfrastructure with a
do so for the 1831, 1832 OR DDoS attack. The force
benefit of a (economic Electronic used must not rise to the
foreign espionage and countermeasures to level of "armed attack"
government or theft of trade stop the attack or under Carr-Schmitt's six




Terrorism Violence or the Domestic Hack-Back: Hack-Back:
threat of criminal Electronic Destroy the devices
violence prosecution countermeasures to associated with the actor.
intended to under 18 stop the attack or OR
intimidate the U.S.C. §§ block the accounts Resort to military force
populace or a 2331-2339 4 or device(s) against actor under the
government, § 1030. associated with the unwilling and unable
which is actor. standard if attack satisfies
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V. THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO AN EXAMPLE OF CYBER TERRORISM
On August 24, 2015, the United States killed a top hacker for ISIS
with a military airstrike.1 6 8  The United States targeted the
cyberterrorist for hacking and posting the personal identifying
information of military and government personnel on the Internet.1 69
In March 2015, a few months before the airstrike, the hacker posted a
list of one hundred soldiers with their photos, email addresses, and
physical addresses on an ISIS website.170 In late July and early
August of 2015, he posted similar information of another 1,300
military and government employees on "jihadi forums" and social
media sites.1 7 1 With each posting, the hacker added a message urging
ISIS supporters to carry out "lone wolf attacks"1 72 on the soldiers
whose information he listed.17 1
As early as the mid-1980s, the United States recognized cyber
terrorism posed a threat to national security.174 However, the August
168. US Airstrike Killed Top ISIL Hacker-CENTCOM,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, (Aug. 28, 2015) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/news/2015/08/mil-150828-sputnik03.htm; Mark Hosenball and Andrea
Shalal, U.S. Confirms Islamic State Computer Expert Killed in Air Strike,
REUTERS.COM (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/28/us-
mideast-crisis-hacker-idUSKCNOQX2A420150828#YpSJt3SOcO8JvOec.97. The
hacker was Junaid Hussain was a British citizen who left Britain to join ISIS in
2013. Id.
169. Hosenball, supra note 168; Stalinsky, supra note 8.
170. Hosenball, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. See generally Naina Bejekal, The Rise of the Lone Wolf Terrorist,
TIME.COM (Oct. 23, 2014), http://time.com/3533581/canada-ottawa-shooting-lone-
wolf-terrorism/ (A lone wolf attack is an attack carried out by an independent
individual in the name of a terrorist organization.).
173. Stalinsky, supra note 8; US Airstrike Killed Top ISIL Hacker-
CENTCOM, supra note 8.
174. E.g., Robert Kelly-Gross, 1983 Hacking Investigation: EC's Sauls was
Involved, DAILYADvANCE.COM (Jan. 10, 2015), https://www.dailyadvance.com/
features/1983 -hacking-investigationi-ecs-sauls-was-involved-2767759. (In 1983, the
United States House of Representatives began holding hearings on hacking and
computer security after the 414s broke into computer systems at a range of
institutions including Los Alamos Laboratories.); Urizenus Sklar, More About
Electronic Disturbance Theater, HUGFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/urizenus-sklar/more-about-the-electronic-b
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24, 2015 attack was the first time the United States countered cyber
terrorism with a military airstrike. The United States and its allies
experienced multiple cyber attacks at the hands of ISIS hackers. 7 5
The specific hacker targeted by the United States was attributed with
stealing and posting personal identifying information of over one
thousand military and government personnel. 176  It is not clear
whether any direct harm was caused by these postings in particular,
but it is not hard to imagine the potential for grave injury that could
have been caused. For example, if soldiers or personnel who were on
covert missions were exposed by the posts, they could have been
tortured or killed.
Once the United States experienced these attacks, in time, it was
able to identify the actor. Because the hacker was linked to ISIS, was
politically motivated, and used the threat of violence (calling for
others to attack the soldiers posted), the act is best categorized as one
of cyber terrorism. This conclusion is furthered by the fact that these
attacks were not carried out for financial gain, and, therefore, less
appropriately categorized as cyber crime. Domestic prosecution was
likely unavailable considering the hacker was located either in Iraq or
Syria where no government could be bargained with for extradition.
Additionally, the hacker was part of ISIS's armed terrorist activities as
an unlawful combatant, and if he were taken into custody Guantanamo
Bay would have been a likely destination.
Despite the potential for danger, the cyberterrorist attack was not
an armed attack under Carr-Schmitt's criteria:
(1) Severity: There was no physical injury or property
destroyed.
770735.html. In 1998, The Electronic Disturbance Theater orchestrated a protest in
support of the Zapatista guerilla movement in Mexico where individuals targeted the
Pentagon, the White House, the School of the Americas, the office of Mexico's
President, the Mexican Stock Exchange, and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Id. An
estimated 10,000 people attacked the targeted websites, overloading the sites and
shutting them down. Id. Chaos Computer Club, "Europe's largest association of
hackers" claims to have been in business for over thirty years.
CHAOSCOMPUTERCLUB.COM, https://www.ccc.de/en/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
175. See Hosenball, supra note 168; Stalinsky, supra note 8.
176. See Hosenball, supra note 168; Stalinsky, supra note 8.
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(2) Immediacy: The attack occurred relatively quickly, but
there was time to use lesser force to resolve the danger.
For example, the postings could be taken down.
(3) Directness: As of the writing of this paper, no one was
injured as a direct consequence of the attack.
(4) Invasiveness: Additionally, posting the personal
information of soldiers and government personnel was
almost certainly an invasion of their privacy, and may
have placed their lives in danger. Thus, the relative
intrusiveness is moderately high.
(5) Measurability: There was no quantifiable damage caused
by the attack.
(6) Presumptive legitimacy: Finally, the attack was not
presumptively legitimate. No domestic or international
law treats unprivileged posting of personal information
with a call to assassinate those posted as a lawful activity.
Because four out of the six factors clearly weigh in favor of not
classifying the attack as an armed attack, the United States' armed
response is not justifiable under jus ad bellum.
Under these restrictions, hacking-back with a cyber attack
targeting the hacker would have been justified and possible. If the
United States knew who the hacker was and where he was, it is likely
they were aware of at least some of his cyber activities. The United
States could have sought to ban any online accounts associated with
the hacker's activities, or deployed electronic countermeasures to
disable or destroy any devices he was using.
The example of the ISIS hacker's cyber activities is but one small
glimpse of when a hack-back response would have been appropriate.
True, this response could have inadvertently interfered with the rights
of innocent users if the hacker was sharing accounts of devices with
others. However, this collateral interference seems negligible by
comparison to that caused by a drone strike. Terrorist acts are,
without question, vile and intolerable, but responding to a
cyberterrorist's online postings with such deadly force is excessive
and difficult to justify. Hacking-back, on the other hand, is
proportionate and justifiable.
1432016]
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VI. CONCLUSION
The unique aspects of cyberspace can be accounted for when
considering an appropriate legal regime for responding to international
cyber attacks. However, the technology behind the Internet continues
to advance, and more and more users are connecting. Lawmakers are
considering ways to address the challenges posed by non-state actors
in cyberspace, but many unsolved legal questions have gone
unanswered in the face of politics and policy. 17 7 Meanwhile, law
enforcement and the military are playing catch-up to investigate and
respond to cyber attacks. A framework must be synthesized before
the problem becomes too unwieldly.
It is essential for the U.S. Government to adopt a legal framework
to effectively address the full spectrum of cyber attacks. The
framework of this Note drew on domestic law as well as established
and nascent principles of international law to solve this problem.
However, this framework is but one example of solutions available,
and, because of the scope of this paper, cannot possibly be all-
inclusive. Indeed, other existing laws may effectively be combined to
provide responders with a clear methodology to deal with non-state
actors in cyberspace. What this Note sought to clarify was that cyber
attacks can vary as widely as the groups who perpetrate them. This
variety implicates a range of traditional laws that can be transposed
onto cyberspace. However, whatever the framework the United States
adopts to respond to non-state actors in cyberspace, it ought to be one
that does not unnecessarily impede a free and open Internet, and this is
arguable best achieved by permitting -law enforcement or military to
hack-back.1 7 8
Adopting a hack-back response is critical to protect our personal
computers and cyberinfrastructure from malicious international actors.
True, hacking-back carries with it the possibility that fickle cyber
conflicts may escalate. However, when considering the alternatives,
hacking-back may be the -lesser of two evils. It is better than
permitting malicious cyber actors to go unpunished, leaving the world
economy to suffer billions in losses annually. It is better than running
drone strikes on hackers. Moreover, it is the most viable way to
177. Beard, supra note 22, at 47 (internal quotations omitted).
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address our cybersecurity concerns if we intend to keep the Internet a
fluid, free exchange of information between autonomous, anonymous
users. Indeed, hacking-back empowers victims of cyber attacks to
protect their interests without burdening them with the charge of
increasing their cybersecurity to a level where they can or should be
able to prevent all malicious attacks. Such an alternative in unrealistic
and may even be impossible. Thus, it is essential that lawmakers
develop clear guidelines as to when and how to hack-back to deal with
the broad range of cyber attacks the United States experiences daily.
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